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NOTES AND COMMENTS
RELEASING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS ACQUITTED AND
COMMITTED BECAUSE OF INSANITY: THE NEED
FOR BALANCED ADMINISTRATION*
BECAUSE criminal defendants who are acquitted on grounds of insanity 1
are nearly always committed to mental institutions, 2 their timely release is
dependent upon an adequate civil procedure for adjudging them capable of
*In re Rosenfield, 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957), remanded per curiam for further
proceedings sub now. Rosenfield v. Overholser, No. 14340, D.C. Cir., Dec. 2, 1958.
1. Today, "insanity" is generally considered a legal concept, not a medical diagnosis.
OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRISr AND THE LAW 61 (1953) ; Dession, The Mentally Ill
Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Administration, 53 YALE L.J. 684, 686 (1944).
Because insanity was considered a medical term at the outset of the century, e.g., OPPEN-
HEIMER, THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF LUNATICS 9-10 (1909), many commentators
equate it with mental illness. See GLUECK, MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW
275 (1925); PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 744 (1957). See also WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW
292-94 (1953). The resultant ambiguity has created demands for the abandonment of the
term. See, e.g., WVEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 5 (1954).
In law, insanity denotes the absence of requisite mental capacity because of a mental
disorder. 3 WITTHAUS & BEcKER, MEDICAL JURISPRUDENCE 181 (1896). Since different
issues-e.g., competency to stand trial as opposed to responsibility for the act-require
different degrees of mental balance, the test for capacity varies with the nature of the
problem. See Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667, 670 n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1958). See also OVER-
HOLSER, op. cit. supra; PERKINS, op. cit. supra. The plea of insanity at criminal trial
asserts the individual's inability to form a criminal intent which would render him respon-
sible for his antisocial behavior. State v. Brown, 36 Utah 46, 58, 102 Pac. 641, 645 (1909);
HALL, CRIMINAL LAW 478 (1947); MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 125 (1934).
2. A finding of not guilty due to insanity constitutes a full acquittal. WAITE,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 329 (3d ed. 1947). Although no appeal is there-
fore permitted, People v. Scarborough, 52 Cal. App. 2d 210, 125 P.2d 893 (1942) ; Camp-
bell v. Downer, 94 Kan. 674, 146 Pac. 1039 (1915), the offender is nonetheless detained.
At common law, the courts possessed the power to order immediate confinement. See
United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 887, 891 (No. 15577) (C.C.D.C. 1835) ; Com-
monwealth v. Meriam, 7 Mass. 168 (1810). But see Danforth v. State, 75 Ga. 641, 625
(1885) (dictum); Ballard v. State, 19 Neb. 609, 617-18, 28 N.W. 271, 275 (1886)
(dictum). Presently indefinite commitment is covered by statute in almost all jurisdic-
tions. See appendix, synopsis A, p. 306 infra.
Statutes compelling prompt commitment without further judicial inquiry were once
held unconstitutional for failure to provide hearings on current mental status. Brown v.
Urquhart, 139 Fed. 846 (C.C.W.D. Wash. 1905), rev'd on other grounds, 205 U.S. 179
(1907); In re Boyett, 136 N.C. 415, 48 S.E. 789 (1904); see SMoor, INSANITY 378
(1929). But modem decisions, relying on a continuing presumption of insanity and the
availability of habeas corpus proceedings to challenge illegal detention, have universally
upheld these statutes. E.g., In re Slayback, 209 Cal. 480, 288 Pac. 769 (1930); In re
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returning to society. Recommendations or requests that a committed patient
be discharged are usually routed through one of three channels.3 A small
minority of states vest an administrative agency with ultimate authority to
release a patient. 4 Other states either grant primary discretion over dis-
charges to the supervisors of their mental institutions 5 or, by failing to enact
any statutory release procedure, allow the supervisors to assume that power
by default.6 The third and largest group of jurisdictions stipulate that dis-
Clark, 86 Kan. 539, 121 Pac. 492 (1912); People v. Dubina, 304 Mich. 363, 3 N.W.2d
99 (1943) ; State v. Saffron, 146 Wash. 202, 262 Pac. 970 (1927). Generally, court instruc-
tions informing the jury that the defendant will be committed upon an insanity finding
are not required, even in the jurisdictions where commitment may follow without a hear-
ing. State v. Daley, 54 Ore. 514, 103 Pac. 502 (1909). Contra, Lyles v. United States,
254 F.2d 725, 728 (D.C. Cir. 1957).
3. Two states do not fall within any of the three general categories. In North Caro-
lina, defendants acquitted of a capital felony can be released only by an act of the gen-
eral assembly; those acquitted of lesser offenses must be discharged by the governor.
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 122-86 (1952). And in Massachusetts, a person acquitted of
murder must be committed for life with release left to gubernatorial discretion. MAss.
ANN. LAws ch. 123, § 101 (1957).
4. Only two jurisdictions specifically empower administrative agencies to make such
a decision. Kansas authorizes its Department of Social Welfare to make release deter-
minations, but allows the department to delegate this function to the superintendent of
the place of detention. KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1532 (1950). Ohio utilizes a com-
mission composed of a specified judge, the superintendent of a designated hospital, and
an alienist selected by them. OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1954).
In one and possibly two other states, administrative agencies also have release au-
thority. Georgia statutorily provides that acquitted, committed offenders are to be dis-
charged like other mental patients. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1953). Ordinary patients
are supervised by the Board of Control of Eleemosynary Institutions. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 35-202 (1953) ; see Bailey v. State, 210 Ga. 52, 77 S.E.2d 511 (1953). New Hampshire
may utilize the commission possessing release authority over regular mental patients,
but there the statutory provisions are extremely ambiguous. If the judge deems an
acquitted offender dangerous to society, he may send him either to prison or the state
hospital. In both instances, incarceration is for life absent discharge in "due course of
law." N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:3 (Supp. 1957). The statute authorizes court-deter-
mined releases of individuals sent to penal institutions but does not mention the discharge
of hospitalized defendants. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 607:4 (1955). Since another statute
authorizes either the court or a commission of lunacy to review noncriminal discharge
applications, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 135:28 (1955), presumably one or the other as-
sumes jurisdiction.
5. Two jurisdictions statutorily provide for institutional release. TEx. CODE CRI1M.
PRoc. ANN. art. 932b, § 2 (Supp. 1958) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 19-213 (1949) (superintendent
of hospital where detained plus superintendent of different state hospital). Two states-
Arkansas and Wyoming-reach the same result by employing the procedure used for all
mental patients, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-242 (Supp. 1957); WYO. ComP. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-905 (Supp. 1957), which in effect means hospital discharge, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-
235 (1948); Wyo. Comp. STAT. ANN. § 51-223 (1946).
6. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 378 (1954); H.R. REP.
No. 892, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 13 (1955) [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.]. Thirteen states
may be so categorized. The statutes authorizing general release proceedings for all men-
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charges are subject to judicial hearings or approval. 7 In some of these states,
court action may consist of ratifying any release approved by hospital au-
thorities.8 On the other hand, judicial supervision can be quite stringent
when courts demand convincing proof of a patient's recovery before permit-
ting his release.9
The revised District of Columbia release procedures are of particular in-
terest, as they were prompted by a modification of the conventional test at
trial for exculpatory insanity. Whether the accused is criminally responsible
for his antisocial conduct has conventionally been determined by the M'Nagh-
ten rule, which looks to his ability to perceive the quality of his act and to
tal patients are collected in appendix, synopsis B, p. 307 infra. In two of the listed
jurisdictions-Nebraska and Oklahoma-the commitment statutes refer simply to dis-
charge in accordance with law or by due process of law. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-
2203 (1948) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (1958). For a discussion of the custom-
ary discharge authority of the superintendent, see GUTTMACHER & WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIA-
TRY AND THE LAW 316 (1952); Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the Mentally
I1, 24 TEXAS L. REV. 307, 331-33 (1946).
7. Nineteen jurisdictions apparently grant the court final fact-finding authority. See
appendix, synopsis C, p. 307 infra. Two states provide for jury trials. Ibid.
Three statutes pose difficult construction problems. The superintendents of the state
hospitals are empowered to discharge any patient, except one "held on order of a court
or judge having criminal jurisdiction in any action or proceeding arising out of a crim-
inal offense." ALASKA Comp. LAws ANN. § 51-4-9 (1948); NEv. REV. STAT. § 433.550
(1957); Oma. R.Ev. STAT. § 426.300 (1957). But institutionalization statutes in Alaska
and Oregon permit committal "to any lunatic asylum authorized ... to receive and keep
such persons until he becomes sane or be otherwise discharged therefrom by authority
of law." ALASKA Comp'. LAWS ANN. § 66-13-78 (1948); ORE. REv. STAT. § 136.730
(1957). And Nevada requires institutionalization "until he be regularly discharged there-
from in accordance with law." NEv. REv. STAT. § 175.445 (1956). The latter Alaska,
Oregon and Nevada provisions imply institutional release while the former indicate the
absence of such authority. Since a defendant will have been acquitted, however, the court
will no longer possess "criminal" jurisdiction over him. Possibly, the former provisions
apply to individuals found mentally incapable of standing trial or deranged convicts
transferred to mental institutions. On the other hand, the New York statute requiring
court-approved discharge of any inmates "held upon order of a court or judge having
criminal jurisdiction in an action or proceeding arising out of a criminal offense," N.Y.
MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 87, has been categorized by commentators as relating to of-
fenders committed after an insanity acquittal. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08, comment (Tent.
Draft No. 4, 1955); WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRITMINAL DEFENSE 376 n.3
(1954). If this classification is transposed, abrogation of institutional authority in Alaska,
Nevada and Oregon implies that release authority there resides in the court.
Even in those states not authorizing judicial supervision, access to the courts is avail-
able by means of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Prior exhaustion of statutory
remedies is required before a writ will issue in most jurisdictions. WaIHOFEXN, MENTAL
DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 379-81 (1954) ; see note 55 infra.
8. See Ky. REv. STAT. § 202.350(2) (1953); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (Supp.
1957) ; State ex rel. Sundberg v. District Court, 185 Minn. 396, 241 N.W. 39 (1932). A
similar result would probably be reached in Michigan and West Virginia. See MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 28.967 (1954) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 6198 (1955).
9. See, e.g., State v. Hartman, 192 Wash. 559, 74 P.2d 226 (1937).
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choose right from wrong.10 Many jurisdictions also have an "irresistible im-
pulse" provision--designed to prevent the punishment of defendants who can-
not restrain sudden, malevolent urges.'I Observing, in Durham v. United
States, that neither test is psychiatrically acceptable, 12 the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia formulated a supplementary standard to provide
10. The rule originated in M'Naghten's Case, 10 Cl. & Fin. 200, 210, 8 Eng. Rep.
718, 722 (H.L. 1843). Its present status, including variations appearing in different juris-
dictions, is found in WEIHIOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINA. DEFENSE 68-76
(1954). Commentators disagree as to whether the "wrong" referred to in the rule denotes
moral or legal wrong. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 126-27 (1934). For a brief discussion of
the history of M'Naghten, see Tulin, The Problem of Mental Disorder in Crime: A
Survey, 32 COLUm. L. REv. 933, 935-40 (1932).
The only jurisdiction which has completely repudiated M'Naghten is New Hamp-
shire, which refuses to adopt any given test and evaluates the defendant's mental state
in relation to the act charged. State v. Jones, 50 N.H. 369 (1871); State v. Pike, 49
N.H. 399 (1869); GLuEcIC, MENTAL DIsoRR AND THE CRIMINAL. LAW 254-66 (1925);
MILLER, op. cit. supra at 132; VEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
115-16 (1954).
Deranged defendants are not immediately prosecuted in any jurisdiction, e.g., State
v. Schrader, 135 Wash. 650, 656-57, 238 Pac. 617, 620 (1925), since an individual may
not be tried while he is incapable of making a rational defense, Jordan v. State, 124
Tenn. 81, 87, 135 S.W. 327, 328 (1910). Instead if there is sufficient proof of incom-
petency to stand trial, the defendant is either hospitalized at some point preceding trial,
WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 436-38 (1954), or, more often,
at the trial itself, id. at 439-49. As these individuals still have criminal charges pending
against them, they are not subsequently released but are returned to the court when
deemed competent to stand trial.
11. MILLER, CRIMINAL LAW 127-29 (1934). See generally Keedy, Irresistible Impulse
as a Defense in the Criminal Law, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 956 (1952) (collecting cases). This
concept, formulated prior to M'Naghten, was American in origin. Note, 30 IND. L.J. 194,
198 (1955).
12. 214 F.2d 862, 870-74 & nn.23-37 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
Criticism of M'Naghten has been an active pastime of most psychiatrists writing on
legal problems. HALL, CRIMINAL LAW 480-81 (1947); see, e.g., WHITE, INSANITY AND
THE CRIMINAL LAw 99 (1923); ZILBOORG, MIND, MEDICINE AND MAN 246-97 (1943).
A poll of Canadian psychiatrists revealed that 78 out of 86 were not satisfied with the
31V'Naghten rule. Stevenson, Insanity as a Defence for Crime: An Analysis of Replies
to a Questionnaire, 25 CAN. B. REv. 871 (1947). A similar poll of over 300 American
psychiatrists revealed that 80% considered ,M'Naghten unsatisfactory. GUTTMACHER &
WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 408-09 (1952). M'Naghten has occasionally
received psychiatric support. See, e.g., EAST, AN INTRODUCTION ro FoRENSIC PSYCrIATRy
IN THE CRIMINAL CoURTs 73-74 (1927); Wertham, Book Review, 22 U. CHI. L. REv.
569, 570 (1955). See also Hall, Psychiatry and Criminal Responsibility, 65 YALE L.J.
761 (1956) (legal evaluation of psychiatric criticism).
In a recently conducted survey, a majority of American psychiatrists termed the
"irresistible impulse" test unsatisfactory. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01, app. B (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955). And 74 of 76 Canadian psychiatrists interrogated also rejected the test.
Stevenson, supra. For detailed criticism, see WERTHAM, THE: SHow OF VIOLENCE 13-14
(1949); Macniven, Psychoses and Criminal Responsibility, in MENTAL ANORMALITY
AND CRIME 65-71 (Radzinowicz & Turner ed. 1944). But see WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DIS-
ORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 82-83 (1954) ; Hoedemaker, "Irresistible 1npulse" as a
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a defense for individuals who are neither completely irrational nor irresistibly
compelled but whose actions are nonetheless the product of a mental disease
or defect.13 Apparently of the opinion that Durham would lead to an in-
creased number of acquittals on grounds of insanity, 14 Congress passed legis-
lation which seeks to establish adequate criteria and procedures for the release
of committed offenders. 15 This statute requires the judicial approval of all
discharges, and provides that a patient may commence a release proceeding
only by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.' If an institution ini-
tiates such a proceeding, its superintendent must certify to the court which
committed the patient that he has recovered his sanity, is no longer a danger
to himself or to others, and is entitled to his unconditional release.' 7 Alter-
natively, the superintendent may recommend a conditional discharge with
post-release supervision of the patient.' 8 The court may either adopt the
superintendent's recommendation, or--on its own motion or at the request of
the prosecuting authorities-hold a hearing to establish the patient's con-
dition.19 The patient will then be unconditionally discharged, or returned to
the institution, or released under whatever conditions the court may stipu-
late.2 0
Defense in Criminal Law: A Criticism Based on Modern Psychiatric Coicepts, 23
WASH. L. REv. 1, 7 (1948); Keedy, supra note 11, at 989.
In practice, courts and juries have taken cognizance of psychiatric advances by effec-
tively liberalizing the traditional tests. See ROYAL CommissloN ON CAPITAL PuNisH-
MIENT, REPORT 103, 116 (1953) ; cf. Hall & Menninger, A Dual Review, 38 IowA L. REv.
687, 697 (1953).
13. 214 F.2d at 874-75. Durham was "warmly supported by psychiatrists," MODEL
PENAL CODE § 4.01, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955), as facilitating full utilization
of modern scientific knowledge. Guttmacher, The Psychiatrist as an. Expert Witness,
22 U. CHI. L. Rev. 325, 327 (1955) ; Zilboorg, A Step Toward Enlightened Justice, 22
U. CHI. L. REv. 331 (1955). Some psychiatrists have criticized Durham, however. See
Wertham, Psychoauthoritarianism and the Law, 22 U. CHI. L. REv. 336, 337-38 (1955) ;
Roche, Criminality and Mental llness-Two Faces of the Same Coin, 22 U. CHI. L.
REV. 320, 322 (1955).
For a clarification of Durham, see Carter v. United States, 252 F.2d 608, 617-18 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), 19 U. Pnr. L. REV. 671. (1958).
The Durham formulation is terminologically identical with the New Hampshire rule
adhered to in that state since 1869. See note 10 supra. New Hampshire's experience has
been cited as a factor leading to the adoption of the Durham test. Catlin v. United States,
251 F.2d 368, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (concurring opinion). But see Weihofen, The
Flowering of New Hampshire, 22 U. Cm. L. REv. 356 (1955) (no reported case in New
Hampshire involving the insanity defense since the establishment of the "New Hamp-
shire" rule).
14. See H.R. REP'. 10, 16.
15. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301. (Supp. VI, 1958).
16. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(g) (Supp. VI, 1958).
17. D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301(e) (Supp. VI, 1958).
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. "The court shall weigh the evidence and, if the court finds that such person has
recovered his sanity and will not in the reasonable future be dangerous to himself or
1958]
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The first reported decision under the revised District of Columbia statute,
In re Rosenfield, denied a release recommended by the superintendent of a
hospital.21 The patient had been previously discharged conditionally and had
petitioned for an unconditional release. 22 Although the hospital had endorsed
the petition, the court declared that a permanent cure had not been effected
and that unconditional release would therefore be premature.23 Asserting that
psychiatry is not an exact science 24 and that thwarting malingerers was one
of the objectives of the recent congressional act,2 5 the court rejected the
psychiatric evidence supporting the application and dismissed the action. 2 3 In
the final analysis, the case turned on a passage in the hospital's report stating
that Rosenfield's disturbance was "in remission, '27 and on a medical diction-
ary's definition of that term as a temporary cessation of a permanent con-
dition.
28
The term was unduly emphasized, however, since the hospital's extensive
report concluded that Rosenfield had recovered, a diagnosis supported by
oral testimony of his attending psychiatrist.29 Furthermore, in thus establish-
others, the court shall order such person unconditionally released from further confine-
ment in said hospital. If the court does not so find, the court shall order such person
returned to said 'hospital." Ibid. The statute does not subject to judicial scrutiny the
superintendent's opinion on the propriety of release.
21. 157 F. Supp. 18 (D.D.C. 1957), remanded per curiam for further proceedings sub
nom. Rosenfield v. Overholser, No. 14340, D.C. Cir., Dec. 2, 1958.
22. Id. at 18-19.
23. Id. at 22.
24. Id. at 20-21.
25. On the other hand, criminals, who have successfully pleaded insanity, have been
known to claim that they are of sound mind promptly after serious criminal
charges no longer confronted them. Yet to turn them free forthwith would be not
only stultifying, but would also mean that guilty persons would go unwhipped of
justice, thus dealing a blow at the administration of the criminal law and possibly
encouraging other criminals.
Id. at 19.
It is not beyond the realm of possible contemplation that occasionally a sane,
dangerous criminal may be found not guilty on the ground of insanity and might
be turned loose to resume his depredations on the community, if he is not incar-
cerated somewhere for an appreciable length of time ...
It was against this background that the Congress passed [§ 24-301] ....
Id. at 21.
26. Id. at 22.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid. On appeal, the case was remanded for an explicit finding as to whether
Rosenfield would be "'dangerous to himself or the community in the reasonably foresee-
able future.'" No. 14340, D.C. Cir., Dec. 2, 1958 (quoting Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d
667, 670 (D.C. Cir. 1958)). For the view that remissions are fairly common in mental
disorders and that they may last for many years during which the patients "are dangerless
and can safely be at large in the community," see Guttmacher, supra note 13, at 329.
29. See 157 F. Supp. at 22.
"In any event, the court made no attempt to resolve the supposed contradiction in the
return by calling the Superintendent .... [T]his should have been done before the court
[Vol. 69:293
RELEASING COMMITTED DEFENDANTS
ing "total recovery" as the determinative release criterion, the decision sets
an undesirable precedent. Social reorientation is dependent not upon the com-
plete disappearance of mental illness but the abatement of antisocial tenden-
cies. 30 Since remnants of mental abnormality can practically always be dis-
cerned long after rehabilitation, the psychiatric profession could not honestly
implement the Rosenfield standard.3 ' Indeed, psychiatrists might be forced
into certifying evasive reports in order to prevent continued detention and to
avoid the possible psychological harm to a rehabilitated patient which the
denial of a discharge might cause.3 2  Inasmuch as Durham was written to
reconcile differences between the legal and psychiatric approaches to mental
reached a conclusion . . . " No. 14340, D.C. Cir., Dec. 2, 1958 (remanding for further
proceedings).
The district court had observed that the superintendent had characterized Rosenfield as
recovered and no longer dangerous. The court had then noted a statement in the super-
intendent's answer indicating that the medical authorities at the hospital were of the
opinion that the
petitioner "is suffering from schizophrenic reaction, chronic undifferentiated type,
but that since the petitioner's readmission to Saint Elizabeths Hospital . . . the
psychosis has been in remission". This statement seems to contradict the averment
that the petitioner recovered from the psychosis, and it likewise contradicts the
oral testimony. The term "remission" at best means a temporary recovery, perhaps
a temporary, partial recovery.
157 F. Supp. at 22.
Dr. Winfred Overholser, Superintendent of Saint Elizabeths Hospital, has offered
the following explanation of the recommendation for release:
Following his readmission to Saint Elizabeths Hospital, after being acquitted by
reason of insanity, Mr. Rosenfield appeared in a medical staff conference on
January 7, 1957 at which time the following diagnosis was made "Schizophrenic
reaction. Chronic Undifferentiated Type. (In remission)." This diagnosis was made
because of the fact that Mr. Rosenfield's psychosis was considered to be in re-
mission at the time of his readmission to this hospital. You will note that the
certification to Court for unconditional release was dated Nov. 29, 1957, almost
a year after the diagnosis was made. It was our belief that since the psychosis
had been in remission for such a lengthy period that the patient could be certified
as recovered.
Letter from Dr. Winfred Overholser to the Yale Law Journal, Sept. 26, 1958, on file in
Yale Law Library.
30. Overholser v. De Marcos, 149 F.2d 23, 24 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S.
889 (1945) ; Guttmacher, supra note 13, at 328-29.
31. "[I1t is not possible for a psychiatrist to certify that any patient is permanently
recovered, since there is always the possibility of another psychotic reaction. . . . [A]ny-
one might develop a mental illness under certain conditions and stresses." Letter from
Dr. Winfred Overholser to the Yale Law Journal, Sept. 26, 1958, on file in Yale Law
Library. See also Guttmacher, supra note 13, at 329.
Several present-day statutes also create an intolerable situation for the psychiatrist
by conditioning discharge upon criteria of total recovery or absence of relapse possibility.
See, e.g., MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1957) ; WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 10.76.070
(1956). Compare State v. Hartman, 192 Wash. 559, 74 P.2d 226 (1937).
32. "[The] failure to grant discharge to a patient when he has recovered and it is
deemed medically advisable, could quite conceivably interfere with the patient's rehabili-
tation." Letter from Dr. Winfred Overholser to the Yale Law Journal, Oct. 22, 1958,
on file in Yale Law Library.
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responsibility, Rosenfield's exacerbation of those differences appears unfortu-
nate.
33
Also unfortunate is the court's apparent characterization of the status of
insanity defenses in modern criminal law. Although technically relying on
the "remission" clause of the psychiatric report, the opinion reflects the view
that defendants who have successfully feigned mental illness to evade criminal
punishment should be detained in a mental institution until they have paid
their debt to society.34 This view is untenable because, once the issue of in-
sanity is resolved by a jury at criminal trial, it may not be reopened in a
collateral proceeding.3 5 If an accused is acquitted and hospitalized, he should
be confined only so long as his mental condition renders him dangerous:
prolonged confinement can serve no criminological purpose. Retribution is
33. The court construed the enactment of § 24-301 to support its decision. 157 F.
Supp. at 21-22. Formerly, the superintendent had exercised exclusive authority over re-
lease determinations. H.R. Rs. 13. The present three prerequisites to release-recovery
of sanity, no longer a danger to self or society, superintendent's opinion on propriety of
discharge-could be said to indicate a congressional intent that prolonged detention be
the rule, and that only in exceptional cases would early release be justified: any of the
three factors by itself could have been deemed sufficient to warrant discharging a patient.
Most jurisdictions, however, employ one or both of the first two standards; hence, Con-
gress probably adopted prevailing terminology. Ibid. And the superintendent's opinion,
although required to initiate a proceeding, has no bearing on the court's role. See note
20 supra. Indeed, the congressional report demonstrates that Congress sought additional
scrutiny, not delayed release. H.R. REP. 13.
The wording of the statute is vague. "Recovery of sanity" is a meaningless phrase,
as sanity connotes different mental conditions in differing situations. See note 1 stupra.
In a release context, it should mean a degree of recovery permitting participation in
society without any danger to the community. See note 39 infra. Since this constitutes
the second criterion, the first may refer to the tests for criminal responsibility needed to
establish insanity at trial. This test is inapplicable in a release proceeding, however,
because both M'Naghten and Durham relate to an individual's capacity with reference
to a specific act and not to his general mental condition. The third standard-super-
intendent's opinion as to whether the patient is entitled to release-establishes no definite
criterion and, taken alone, might permit capricious or malicious denials. In order to up-
hold its constitutionality, the requirement must be construed as a formality.
34. See note 25 supra.
35. The "double jeopardy" doctrine prohibits successive prosecutions of the same
person for the same offense. Note, 67 YALE L.J. 916, 918-19 nn.13-17 (1958) (collecting
cases). And prosecutors may not relitigate facts necessarily found at trial. See Sealfon
v. United States, 332 U.S. 578 (1948) ; Lugar, Criminal Law, Double Jeopardy and Res
.Tdicata, 39 IowA L. REV. 317, 333-34 (1954) (acquittal on grounds of insanity in a
prosecution for aggravated assault bars a second prosecution for murder when victim
dies). A fortiori, courts may not in effect overrule acquittals by detaining acquitted,
committed defendants on a suspicion of malingering.
Another argument against reopening the insanity issue in the District of Columbia
is that Congress has recognized the possibility that malingerers may be acquitted. Leg-is-
lation to permit the admission of psychiatric evidence and to render the physician-patient
privilege inapplicable to insanity pleas was enacted by Congress simultaneously with
§ 24-301. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-308 (Supp. VI, 1958). The express purpose of this
legislation was the prevention of malingering. H.R. REP. 14-16. A like purpose is not
[Vol. 68: 293
RELEASING COMMITTED DEFENDANTS
inapposite, since the mentally ill by definition are not criminally responsible
for their behavior.36 The deterrence of other potential offenders would be an
acceptable rationale were legally insane persons capable of balancing their
desire to commit antisocial acts against the potential effect of indeterminate
confinement in a mental institution. But a M'Naghten or "irresistible im-
pulse" defense is premised on the absence of rationality ;37 and the Durham
rule, properly administered, comprehends only those offenders who are so
abnormal that the fear of incarceration cannot deter them.8 Finally, the goals
of removing and rehabilitating the accused are achieved through his commit-
ment up to the point that social readjustment is accomplished.3 9 Prolonged
detention under a "total recovery" standard, however, may equate institu-
tionalization with a prison sentence and thereby defeat both the jury's acquit-
tal and the medical profession's efforts at rehabilitation.
M1ore fundamentally, the Rosenfield test is a manifestation of the under-
lying legislative assumption that, in this area, the judiciary is the most com-
petent decision-maker. The assumption seems unjustified, for most judges
found in the legislative history of § 24-301. Congress thus sought to detect malingering
in its incipiency, not to grant courts the discretion to incarcerate sane individuals in a
mental institution whenever, despite a jury acquittal at trial, a feigned mental disorder
is suspected.
36. See note 1 supra.
Of course, a primitive view of retribution-striking back at someone causing harm-
would justify prolonged confinement. But retribution is commonly thought of in terms
of justice-he who chooses to do evil will have evil done to him in return. An insane
individual lacks criminal intent and could not be punished under this view. See Williams,
The Royal Commission and the Defence of Insanity, in 7 CuIU"NT LEGAL PROBIEMS 16,
18 (Keeton & Schwarzenberger ed. 1954).
37. See note 10 supra and accompanying text (M'Naghten); Parsons v. State, 81
Ala. 577, 2 So. 854 (1887) (leading case on "irresistible impulse").
33. If Durham will in fact extend the definition of the legally insane, it will do so
by embracing psychopaths. Guttmacher, supra note 13, at 327. A psychopath is unlikely
to respond to community standards or the concept of punishment. See Henderson, Psy-
chopathic Constitution and Criminal Behaviour, in MENTAL ABNORmALITY AND CRIME
105, 109 (Radzinowicz & Turner ed. 1944) ; Lipton, The Psychopath, 40 J. Cum. L. &
CrUMINOLoGY 584-85 (1950) ; Thornton, The Relation Between Crime and Psychopathic
Personality, 42 J. CumI. L., C. & P.S. 199, 200 (1951).
39. See Guttmacher, supra note 13, at 327-28 (1955).
The statutory standard in most jurisdictions refers to the restoration of sanity. Wzi-
HOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 376 (1954). A minority of states
have also adopted a community-danger criterion-essentially equivalent to social read-
justment. Ibid. In practice, release determinations are often made by the court which
originally committed the defendant after the acquittal at trial. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08,
comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955). Most likely, therefore, restoration to sanity is
judicially defined in terms of criminal responsibility-ability to distinguish right from
wrong. See Guttmacher, supra note 13, at 327-28. But a right-wrong test is not necessarily
consonant with the purpose of commitment-protecting the individual and society. Ibid.
Indeed, such a test may lead to premature release. See, e.g., Yankulov v. Bushong, 80
Ohio App. 497, 77 N.E.2d 88 (1945).
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are ill-equipped to make medical findings. 40 In fact, courts are often so sus-
picious of the effectiveness of psychiatric treatment that they are easily swayed
by such factors as the patient's courtroom demeanor.41 Moreover, the frag-
mentation of decision-making under present systems-whereby any of a num-
ber of judges may be assigned hearings for release-prevents the implemen-
tation of a uniform policy governing discharges after commitment. 42 True, in
hospital-instituted proceedings the prospective formality of judicial approval
might induce medical personnel to reconsider doubtful candidates for release.
40. [I]t is not the function of a judge in habeas corpus proceedings to determine
the mental condition of a person who has been committed for insanity .... The
reason for this is that the release of an inmate of a mental institution does not
depend upon legal standards of responsibility for crime or capacity to make a con-
tract, which a court is qualified to apply .... [T~he issue which must ultimately
be decided is whether he has sufficiently recovered from a mental disease so that
he may be safely released.
Overholser v. De Marcos, 149 F.2d 23, 24 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
The institutional inadequacies of courts in adjudicating mental capacity have produced
demands for the substitution of a more adept agency in civil commitment proceedings.
Melaney, Con.-mitment of the Mentally Ill: Treatment or Travesty?, 12 U. PIr. L. REV.
52, 62-63 (1950) ; Weihofen, Commitnent of Mental Patients-Proposals to Eliminate
Some Unhappy Features of Our Legal Procedure, 13 RocKY MT. L. REV. 99, 108 (1941) ;
Note, 3 STAN. L. RV. 109, 110 (1950). But see MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955) (committing court empowered to exercise release authority). Two states-
Arkansas and Texas-have recently substituted hospital release for court approval. Com-
pare ARK. STAT. ANN. § 59-242 (Supp. 1957) with Ark. Acts 1947, No. 241, § 16. Com-
pare TEx. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 932b, § 2 (Supp. 1958) with Tex. Laws 1937,
ch. 466, § 3.
Similarly, criticism of jury determination of criminal responsibility at trial has en-
gendered support for the substitution of a panel of medical experts. See, e.g., Williams,
The Royal Commission and the Defence of Insanity, in 7 CURRENT LEGAL PRO1iLEMIS 16,
24-32 (Keeton & Schwarzenberger ed. 1954). The jury's role has been defended, how-
ever, as providing the means of expression for the moral judgment of the community
which is deemed essential to an inquiry into criminal responsibility. See, e.g., GLUEcK,
MENTAL DISORDER AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 467-68 (1925).
41. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Devereaux, 257 Mass. 391, 153 N.E. 881 (1926).
The recent case of Overholser v. Leach, 257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958), is particularly
illustrative. Reversing the district court's approval of a release petition, the court of
appeals noted that discharge had initially been granted over the objections of all seven
testifying psychiatrists.
See also Gordon & Harris, An Investigation and Critique of the Defective Delinquent
Statute in Massachusetts, 30 B.U.L. REV. 459, 484 (1950) (10 of 35 patients certified as
recovered were refused discharge by court) ; OVERHOLSER, THE PSYCHIATRIST AND THE
LAw 138 (1953) (legal profession unusually suspicious of psychiatry).
42. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1026 (1956). See generally WEHOFEN,
MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 376 (1954).
Furthermore, criminal-court judges do not ordinarily adjudicate insanity issues, since
civil commitment and restoration proceedings are generally administered in other courts,
such as probate or chancery. 5 VERNIER, AmERICAN FA-ILY LAWS 618-35 (1938) ; see
Note, 32 TEXAS L. REV. 124, 126 (1953) (advocating shifting of release determination
from committing court to probate court).
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But many statutes empower the judiciary to do more than rubber-stamp the
recommendations of a mental institution, and Rosenfield pointedly indicates
that courts will not always act formalistically under these statutes.
Vesting the mental institution with exclusive authority to release would also
be unsatisfactory. On the one hand is the risk that hospital supervisors, under
continual pressure from overcrowded facilities and shortages of trained per-
sonnel,4 3 would discharge a still dangerous individual. On the other is the
possibility that psychiatrists, concerned with effectuating a complete recovery
or afraid of bad publicity should a released patient relapse, may abridge an
inmate's civil liberties by prolonging confinement beyond a legally acceptable
period. 4 In fact, psychiatrists themselves have spoken of the underlying need
for public confidence in the soundness of release procedure, and have sup-
ported the view that they should not exercise exclusive jurisdiction in this
area.45 In sum, the one-sided approach inherent in either judicially super-
vised proceedings or determinations made exclusively by the medical profes-
sion argues for a more broadly proficient tribunal.
An administrative board composed of psychiatrists, lawyers, and repre-
sentatives of the community at large would possess the balanced perspective
needed to evaluate discharge recommendations properly. If feasible, the psy-
chiatrists should be experts on criminal insanity ;46 the attorneys, former trial
judges or experienced criminal practitioners. The lay members could be civic
leaders or clergymen whose extensive contacts would facilitate finding em-
ployment for discharged patients. Sociologists, criminologists and other spe-
cialists could also be employed, either on the board or as expert consultants.
47
43. See Dession, The Mentally Ill Offender in Federal Criminal Law and Adminis-
tration, 53 YALE L.J. 684, 696 (1944); Weihofen & Overholser, Commitment of the
Mentally lll, 24 TEXAS L. REv. 307, 333 (1946).
44. Many "sick" criminals who would ordinarily be released after a brief detention
period might be segregated indefinitely if psychiatrists alone determined time of release.
See Key, Insanity as a Defense in Cases of Murder and Sex Crimes, in MEDICO-LEGAL
MONOGRAPHS 1, 16 (1944) ; Overholser, The Place of Psychiatry h the Cri inal Law,
16 KU.L. R-v. 322, 326 (1936). See Hall & Menninger, supra note 12, at 702; note 45
infra and accompanying text.
The possible extension of Durham to psychopaths, see note 38 supra, may create ex-
ceptional hardships. Generally considered as personality and character disorders, psycho-
pathic abnormalities are deep-seated and substantially less amenable to treatment than psy-
chotic reactions. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 27 (1954).
Thus, relatively minor sex deviates-exhibitionists, peepers, homosexuals-may be in-
definitely institutionalized. Indeed, in most institutions, -no treatment is provided since no
cure is known. Tappan, Sexual Offences and Treatment of Sexual Offenders in the
United States, in SEXUAL OFFENcES 510 (Radzinowicz ed. 1957).
45. See H.R. REP. 14.
46. Compare Wertham, Book Review, 22 U. CHl. L. REV. 569, 570-72 (1955).
47. Penal and parole institutions currently employ sociologists to good effect. MANNq-
HEnr, GROUP PROBLEMS IN CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 177 (1955) ; see, e.g., Conn. Public
Acts 1957, No. 650, § 6.
Modern commentators have repeatedly advocated a distinction between the guilt-find-
ing and treatment phases of criminal law administration. See GLUECK, CRIME AND Coa-
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This diverse composition should not only improve the standards of release
hearings but also facilitate the administration of such post-release supervisory
functions as periodic reviews, social-worker visitations, and psychiatric ex-
aminations.48
As an additional administrative innovation, reforms are needed to provide
adequate procedural rules for handling release since, in most jurisdictions,
the avenues to discharge are unspecified, unclear, or unnecessarily profuse.'40
Ideally, the mental institution should be able to initiate proceedings at any
time; the patient, only when the hospital refuses to act-with limits placed
on successive petitions in order to preclude importunacy. ° Before an appli-
cation for release is reviewed, the inmate concerned should be assigned to an
independent psychiatrist for observation :51 this safeguard against discharges
RE TION 94 (1952); MANNHEI-', CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION 223-37
(1946) ; Comment, 57 YALE L.J. 1085, 1103-04 (1948). But see Dession, Psychiatry and
the Conditioning of Criminal Justice, 47 YALE L.J. 319 (1938) ; Hall & Menninger, supra
note 12, at 701-02. Guilt finding is peculiarly well-suited to the judicial process. According
to GLUECC, AFtER CONDUCT OF DISCHARGED OFFENDERS 101 (1945), the treatment could
be better administered by an expert agency consisting of a trial judge, a psychiatrist or
psychologist and a sociologist or educator. The composition suggested seems appropriate
in the release context as well, because of the direct connection between release policy
and the rehabilitation of an offender.
48. The necessity of follow-up supervision has been recognized in a few jurisdictions
which provide for conditional or convalescent leave. E.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (e)
(Supp. VI, 1958) ; see GLUECK, CRIME AND CORRECTION 159 (1952). Under the cumber-
some and time-consuming District of Columbia system, however, the court must approve
the release conditions.
49. Fifteen jurisdictions have no release provisions. See note 6 supra and accompany-
ing text; appendix, synopsis C, p. 307 infra. Three jurisdictions-Alaska, Nevada and
Oregon-have highly ambiguous statutes. See note 7 supra. Many of the statutes provid-
ing for court-supervised release are nearly as vague. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE
LAW § 87; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 32-927 to -928 (Supp. 1955). See discussion of the New
Hampshire statute at note 4 supra. Most of the states requiring court assent merely
assert the necessity of court approval without detailing any specific procedures. See
statutes of California, Delaware, Indiana, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, New York, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Utah and Vermont, appendix, synopsis C, p. 307
infra. Institutional approval is not usually required, as few jurisdictions compel hospital
certification before discharge. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE
376 (1954).
Some statutes permit any of several different courts to assume jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1026 (1956). The availability of habeas corpus, see note 54
infra, may allow an alternative remedy to be administered by yet another court. See, e.g.,
VT. STAT. § 2464 (1948).
50. Limitations on the frequency of reapplication for release exist in several juris-
dictions. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 382-83 (1954); see,
e.g., IND. STAT. ANN. § 9-1705 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-16 (1953).
51. This procedure is presently utilized in Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4
(1954), and is advocated by the drafters of the Model Penal Code, MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.08, comment (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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inspired by administrative burdens should promote confidence in the pro-
posed board's operations.52 Absent such considerations as recidivism, outside
opposition to release, or an unusually short detention period, unanimously
favorable psychiatric reports should be sufficient to warrant the board's ap-
proving a conditional release without further inquiry. 3 Unconditional release,
however, should always be withheld for some minimal period to effectuate
post-discharge surveillance.
The board's determinations should be appealable to an appropriate review-
ing court. Were this form of judicial supervision adopted, courts would prop-
erly utilize their power to grant writs of habeas corpus only when necessary
to correct abuses of the proposed administrative system-not to make medical
determinations of fact which would duplicate, and thus possibly circumvent,
the normal functioning of the board. 4 An inmate petitioning for a writ
should be required to exhaust his administrative remedies ' and should not
be allowed to use habeas corpus as an alternative avenue to discharge, for
such an option would permit the judiciary to formulate its own release
policies. 0 The sole reason for retaining the writ in this context would be to
protect the patient who is denied either periodic access to an administrative
board or a right of appeal from an unfavorable board decision. 57 And if ap-
pellate review is limited to a determination of whether the board's decisions
are supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole,5 s the requisite
52. Ibid.
53. The drafters of the Model Penal Code have suggested that the prosecuting au-
thorities be notified of any pending release. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (Tent. Draft
No. 4, 1955). And many jurisdictions require such notification. See, e.g., D.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-301(e) (Supp. VI, 1958). As the prosecutor has access to much information
concerning the committed patient, a continuance of this practice would be advisable.
54. In ruling on habeas corpus petitions, courts have frequently re-examined the
patient's mental condition. In re Clary, 149 Cal. 732, 87 Pac. 580 (1906) ; People ex reL.
Woodbury v. Hendrick, 215 N.Y. 339, 109 N.E. 486 (1915); Schutte v. Schutte, 86
W. Va. 701, 104 S.E. 108 (1920). This factual inquiry is permitted because commitment
is proper only until sanity reappears; detention beyond that time is illegal. A recovery
of sanity may always be claimed, for a prior adjudication can never determine present
mental condition. WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A CRIMINAL DEFENSE 383 (1954).
55. Cf. State cx reL. Thomson v. Clifford, 106 Wash. 16, 179 Pac. 90 (1919) ; In re
Ostatter, 103 Kan. 487, 175 Pac. 377 (1918).
56. Abuse of the habeas corpus remedy in the discharge of mental patients has a
lengthy history. See Lamb, The Commitment and Discharge of the Insane Criminal, 32
N.Y.S.B.A. REP. 59, 66 (1909) (court released 34 of 41 patients against medical advice;
14 soon were reincarcerated either in prison or in mental institutions) ; Overholser v. De
Marcos, 149 F.2d 23 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945) ; Overholser v. Leach,
257 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
57. See Overholser v. De 'Marcos, supra note 56, at 24; Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F.2d
857, 864-65 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Overholser v. Treibly, 147 F.2d 705, 707-08 (D.C. Cir.
1945).
58. See Note, 3 STAN. L. REv. 109, 122-23 (1950). The writ of habeas corpus may
be restricted as to frequency of application, WEIHOFEN, MENTAL DISORDER AS A Cams-
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balance between administrative expertise and judicial protection will be at-
tained.
INAL DEFENSE 381, 383 (1954), and is not available until other remedies are exhausted,
cases cited note 55 supra.
Application of the "constitutional fact" doctrine, requiring independent review of facts
determinative of fundamental due process issues, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22
(1932); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922), would be inappropriate. This doc-
trine has been dormant in recent years, though it may still have vitality in civil liberty
cases. DAvis, ADmiNiSTRATIvE LAw 922 (1951). But extending it to sanity cases would
be unwise because of the superior institutional capacities of a specialized agency in deter-
mining the extent of mental disorder. See Note, 3 STAN. L. REv. 109, 125 (1950).
ApPE DIx
Synopsis A
Nine jurisdictions require automatic commitment after an insanity acquittal. CoLo.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4 (1954); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VI, 1958); GA.
CODE ANN. § 27-1503 (1953) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1532 (1950) ; MiNN. STAT.
ANN. § 631.19 (Supp. 1957); NED. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-2203 (1948); NEV. REv. STAT.
§ 175.445 (1956); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.39 (Page 1954); Wis. STAT. § 957.11
(1955).
Eight states grant the court discretionary commitment authority but neither establish
statutory criteria nor require post-trial inquiries. Aiu. STAT. ANN. § 59-242 (Supp.
1957); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 3321(d) (Supp. 1955); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4702
(1953); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28:53 (1951); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 27, § 119
(1954); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-13-3 (1954); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1351 (1930);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-927 (Supp. 1955).
In twelve jurisdictions the court may order commitment if it deems the acquitted
defendant dangerous to public peace or safety. ALASKA Comp. LAWS ANN. § 66-13-78
(1948); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 919.11 (1944); IOWA CODE ANN. § 785.18 (1950); MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 278, § 13 (1956); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 607:3 (1955); N.Y. CODE
CRIM. PROC. § 454; N.D. REV. CODE § 12-0503 (1943); ORE. REV. STAT. § 136.730 (1957) ;
R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 26-4-7 (1957) ; S.D. CODE § 34.3672 (1939) ; VT. STAT. § 2462
(1948) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 19-213 (1949).
Eight states permit commitment after trial if the court determines that the defend-
ant's mental disorder persists. ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 15, § 429 (1941) ; IND. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-1704a (1956) ; Ky. Citm. CODE § 268 (Carroll 1948) ; ,Mlcn. STAT. ANN. § 28.967
(1954); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:163-3 (1953) (jury finding also necessary); N.C. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 122-84 (1952) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-15 (1953) ; W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 6198 (1955).
In seven states, the jury determines the defendant's present mental condition in addi-
tion to his condition at the time of the alleged crime. ILL. Rv. STAT. ch. 38, § 592
(1957); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 8 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. § 2575 (1957); Mo.
ANN. STAT. § 546.510 (1953); OLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1161 (1958); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 932b, § 1 (b) (Supp. 1958) ; WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.76.040
(1956).
A second jury trial to determine present mental condition is required in three states.
ARiEZ. CODE ANN. § 44-1917 (1940) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2320 (1948) ; MOxT. REv.
CODES ANN. § 94-7420 (1949).
California requires commitment unless the court believes the defendant to be fully
recovered. A new sanity determination must then be made, presumably at a second court
hearing. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1026 (1956). Wyoming provides for the immediate
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initiation of mandatory civil commitment proceedings. Wyo. ComP. STAT. ANN. § 10-904
(Supp. 1957). Tennessee authorizes neither statutory nor common-law commitment after
acquittal. Dove v. State, 50 Tenn. 348, 373 (1872). Civil commitment proceedings could
probably be initiated, however. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 33-502, -503 (1955).
Synopsis B
ALA. CODE ANN. tit. 45, § 245 (1941) ; Aiuz. CODE ANN. § 8-208 (Supp. 1952) ; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 394.22(15) (Supp. 1957) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-337 (Supp. 1957) ; Miss.
CODE ANN. § 6916 (1953); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 202.070 (1952), Richey v. Baur, 298
S.W.2d 445 (Mo. 1957); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 38-109 (1954); NEB. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 83-340 (1950); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-107 (Supp. 1958) (board of managers
of institution); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-2-10 (1954) ; N.D. Laws 1957, ch. 196, § 25-0315;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § 73 (1954); TENN. CODE ANN. § 33-633 (1955).
Synopsis C
Seventeen jurisdictions have specific procedures. CAL. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1026 (1956);
COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-8-4 (1954); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8751 (1949); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 4702 (1953); D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-301 (Supp. VI, 1958); IND. STAT.
ANN. § 9-1705 (1956); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28:96 (Supp. 1957); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. ch. 27, § 119 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 59, § 14 (1957); MASS. ANN. LAWS
ch. 278, § 13 (1956); N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 87; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1354
(1930); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 26-3-10 (1957); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-928 (Supp.
1955); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-24-15 (1953); VT. STAT. § 2464 (1948); Wis. STAT.
§ 957.11(4) (1955). In two, the absence of any release provision presumably routes dis-
charges through the courts. IOWA CODE ANN. § 229.31-.36 (1949) ; S.D. CODE § 30.0112
(1939). Two states authorize jury trials. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 592 (1957); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 10.76.070 (1956).
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